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Iran’s Preferred Option: Stability or Instability in Iraq?  I

Thursday, 21 October 2010

Mohammad Khajouei
Middle East Studies Expert

I “A comparison between the role that Iraq plays in ensuring Iran’s security and national interests and that of other neighboring countries will lead us to the conclusion that Iraq plays the most important role. Its role is so crucial as to either guarantee or undermine both countries’ interests.” (Hassan Kazemi Qomi – Iran’s former ambassador to Iraq) I

A recent visit to Tehran by the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maleki, which was undertaken by him to gain more credit and regional support as the next prime minister of Iraq, has provided a new opportunity for certain political circles in Iraq and elsewhere in the region to renew claims about Iran’s attempt to intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs in order to destabilize that country.I I

Some analysts have described Al-Maleki’s Iran visit “different” or “extraordinary” at a time that he had already visited other regional countries like Syria, Jordan, Turkey and some of the Persian Gulf Arab states. I

During recent years, leaders of various political groups in Iraq have been visiting regional and other countries following internal deliberations in order to find a way out of the current political stalemate and clear the way for the establishment of the new Iraqi government. I

What role is Iran actually playing in Iraq? Is Iran really a serious obstacle to establishment of the new government and stability in that country as some political circles claim? Generally speaking, what is the most desirable option for Iran: a destabilized and weakened Iraq or a powerful and stable one? I

The fall of a dictatorial regime following 35 years of repressive rule during which it caused many crises both in and out of the country, was an important turning point for Iraq’s neighbors, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran; a country which was the main victim of the former Iraqi dictator’s unwise policies. I

Although Iran was happy with collapse of Saddam’s regime, from the outset of that country’s occupation, Tehran warned that continued presence of foreign forces in Iraq could entail major security threats for the region. That warning has been verified in the course of time. I

Although Iran has been basically opposed to presence of the American troops in Iraq, Tehran has never adopted a purely passive role in the face of the regional developments. While emphasizing on the need for territorial integrity of Iraq, it has continuously supported establishment of stability, security, and a broad-based government in that country through a majority vote. Thus, Iran has taken a realistic approach by supporting the transition process in Iraq. I

The most important development brought about by political changes in Iraq was for both countries to give up the idea of “mutual threat” which governed their relations as a result of foreign power’s policy of “balance of powers” that aimed to pitch two neighbors against each other. As a result, they have tried to establish constructive relations on the basis of cultural, political, security, and economic commonalties. I

Existence of numerous common grounds, having the longest common borders compared to other neighboring states, existence of six major border passes and twelve border markets, presence of holy shrines in both countries as well as tourism attractions in Iran and Iraq have provided good capacities for cooperation between the two countries in political, cultural, trade, and economic fields. Iran’s valuable experience about post-war reconstruction and Tehran’s readiness to share that experience with Iraq and both countries’ leaders’ firm determination for further strengthening of bilateral relations are good capacities for improved relations between Tehran and Baghdad. I

Developments in recent years and many commonalties have greatly promoted Iran’s influence among the Iraqi masses. I

The ability of a country to gain foothold in other countries is by no means ominous, but is considered a major factor of state power. The negative point is for a country to try to interfere in other country’s internal affairs and destabilize them. I

A lot of effort has been made in recent years to show that Iran’s natural influence in Iraq is abnormal as Tehran aims to make Iraq look unsafe and insecure. Some circles have even exaggerated about Iran’s influence in Iraq as if pro-Iran political groups in that country have no independent will of their own and are just waiting for orders to arrive from Tehran and implement them. I

Those who claim that Iran has been trying to destabilize Iraq have never been ready to answer such simple question as how a country which enjoys the longest common border with Iraq and whose security is directly affected by Iraq’s security, may want to make its neighbor insecure? How is it possible for a country enjoying many commonalties and broad relations with political groups, which can help empowerment of an aligned government in Iraq, to give up this option and seek to make it insecure, thus, turning friends into foes? Or how a country which has made vast economic investments in another country and carries out major trade exchanges with it may want to make it insecure? I

It seems that a large part of anti-Iranian propaganda stems from concerns of propagandists about more closeness between Tehran and Baghdad lest their constructive interaction may further promote their regional standing and isolate certain other states. I

Those, who approach regional relations through negative presumptions, actually think that a “zero-sum game” is unavoidable fate of political relations in the region. It seems, however, that if regional countries banked on their commonalities and stood up against foreign interventions (not interactions), they would be able to make “win-win game” govern regional relations. I